APPEARING AND APPEARANCES IN KANT
In recent writing on the theory of knowledge a distinction has been drawn between 'the language of appearing* and 'the sense datum language* (or 'the language of appearances', as we may more loosely call it). The aim of this paper is to suggest that con sideration of that distinction and of what Kant's attitude toward it would have been can shed light on two otherwise-puzzling aspects of his doctrine in the Critique of Pure Reason: his ada mant conviction that there are things-in-themselves, and his con fidence that the Antinomies are resolved once we admit the tran scendental ideality of space and time.
I
In describing perceptual situations, a group of verbs are used including 'perceive', 'sense', 'intuit', 'see', 'hear', and many others. If there are different and conflicting ways in which this family of verbs are used in philosophical writing or in normal talk, that fact could be of philosophical significance, and consideration of it might well help to clarify some philosophical discussions, especially in cases in the history of philosophy where little explicit attention has been paid to such distinctions. Now, some recent philosophers, especially Ayer1 and Chisholm,2 have urged that there is a philosophically noteworthy distinction to be drawn between two different and conflicting ways in which this group of verbs are used.
One way of speaking has been called the language of appearing (or, less felicitously, the terminology of appearing), and the other may be called the language of appearances (or of sense data). Let us review this distinction, not in order to evaluate its validity or significance for contemporary philosophy, but only with a view to seeing whether it can illuminate Kant's way of thinking. For this purpose, it is not necessary to express the distinction with per fect clarity, even if that be possible; it will suffice to explain it in a way that would have seemed plausible to philosophers of the past.
According to the first of these two ways of speaking about perceptual situations, that someone perceives or sees a thing entails that the thing exists and is not merely in his mind. It would be self-contradictory, if we are using perceptual verbs in this first way, to speak of perceiving or seeing what does not exist outside the mind. For example, saying in this sense that a man perceives or sees a green oasis would involve claiming that there exists a non mental oasis that he is aware of. A man who encounters what is merely a mirage may perhaps think that he is perceiving a green oasis, but he will be mistaken if he thinks so; since what he thinks he is perceiving does not exist, he does not perceive an oasis, accord ing to this way of speaking. Instead, his situation can be described
by saying that what he perceives (perhaps it is part of the sky) appears to him to be an oasis. If we want to give a description of what a man in such a situation is entitled to feel sure of, it would not be that he is perceiving an oasis, but rather that what he perceives appears to him to be an oasis. Because the notion of ap pearing plays this central role in it, this whole way of speaking may conveniently be called the language of appearing.
According to this language of appearing, when perceptual situations are being truly described, perceptual verbs that have grammatical direct objects always must have as direct objects words referring to things that exist outside the mind. Thus the terminology of appearing is apt for expressing the view that in per ception we are "directly acquainted" with things outside our minds; that is, that such things are what we perceive, sense, see, hear, and feel; and that they are what is given to us and what appear to us. If we wish to extend further our characterization of the lan guage of appearing, we may also take account of descriptions of perceptual situations where perceptual verbs are followed by 'that' clauses, as when we say a man perceives or sees that an oasis is green.
According to the language of appearing, the man can perceive or see that the oasis is green only if it is green. And in general someone can perceive, sense, see, etc., that S is P only if S is P.
But the oasis can appear to someone to be green even when it is not; and even if there is no oasis, something can appear to someone to be an oasis and to be green. So again the notion of appearing can be used if we wish to express what it is that someone in such a perceptual situation is entitled to be sure of.
In contrast with this language of appearing, there is another way of using perceptual verbs. This idea of the equal legitimacy of the two languages and of their complete intertranslatability is an attractive idea. Its attrac tiveness is attested to by the fact that Ayer embraced the idea.
He professed to find that the terminology of appearing and the terminology of sense data (as he called them) are on an equal footing, simply two alternative languages, and that it is not mean ingful to ask which is more correct.3 He himself elected to use the sense-datum terminology, holding that in some respects it is more convenient. But he maintained that this was merely an arbitrary verbal decision on his part.4
However, in philosophical discussions of perception it be comes more dubious that there is this intertranslatability of the two ways of speaking. Perhaps one can imagine a philosopher using these two languages in a carefully coordinated way, so that when ever he said anything about perception using the language of appearing he made clear how it was equivalent for him to some thing that could be said in the language of appearances, and when ever he said anything about perception using the language of ap pearances he made clear how it was equivalent for him to something that could be said using the language of appearing. Presumably However, any such inference is logically questionable, so the theory is haunted by the specter of solipsism.
Someone who wanted to hold, as Ayer did, that the language of appearing and the language of appearances are perfectly inter translatable, would have to maintain that there is no real con flict between the theory of appearing and the theory of appearances.
But now, what is such a person to say of the question whether solipsism is easy or difficult to refute? Should he say that the theory of appearances confronts itself with a mere pseudo-problem, on the ground that we have only to translate our remarks into the language of appearing in order easily to refute solipsism? Or should he say that the theory of appearing carelessly overlooks a real problem, for we have only to translate our remarks into the language of appearances in order to see that solipsism is difficult to refute? Neither way of looking at the matter is plausible. The claim that the two languages are fully intertranslatable is not He says that intuition takes place only insofar as the object-here surely the thing-in-itself-is given and the mind affected by it.12 And he says that in inner sense the mind intuits itself-meaning surely that what is intuited is a thing-in-itself.13 These remarks embody the language of appearing. The wealth of quotations that can be cited to illustrate Kant's use of each of these two languages shows that Kant speaks both these languages and does not distinguish between them. Indeed, sometimes we find both ways of speaking side by side in a single one of his sentences. Thus he says that things as objects of our senses existing outside us are given, but we know only their appear ances, that is, the representations which they cause in us.14 And he says that space can be ascribed to things only insofar as they appear to us, that is, only to objects of sensibility.15 In both these sentences of Kant's the language of appearing and the language of appearance are used side by side, clearly indicating that Kant did not recognize any need to distinguish them. As Prichard put it, Kant makes "a transition from 'things as appearing'
to sometimes falls away from this and misleadingly suggests the other view; but Paton's position is that the theory of appearing is Kant's real position, and that Kant's use of the language of appearances is to be explained away. Now, to hold that the theory of appearing is Kant's view is to claim that in principle whatever Kant says using the language of appearances-apart from slips that are to be neglected-can be translated into something expressible in the language of appearing.
If the theory of appearing is Kant's view, then all the essential doctrines of his philosophy must in principle be stateable without using the language of appearances. Paton does not even try to show that this can be done. Indeed, even in his own commentary he free ly uses locutions of his own that are not clearly translatable into the language of appearing, as when he says that appearances are ideas.19 There is much in Kant's teaching that cannot be expressed in the language of appearing, or that would suffer grave change of mean ing if it were so expressed. Kant regularly speaks of appearances as due to the influence of things-in-themselves, and he speaks of things in-themselves as affecting us, or affecting our sensibility and so pro during in us appearances. It might be suggested in reply that this is not really puzzling and that the explanation is that Kant simply failed to recognize the conflict between his rejection of transcendent metaphysics and his retention of the thing-in-itself, because he failed to see that one could doubt the latter. According to this suggestion, he inherited from the dogmatic metaphysics of his predecessors the uncriticized preconception that there could not be a world consisting only o appearances, that such a world would lack the power to be by itself. In line with this suggested explanation, Royce, for ex ample, called the doctrine that there are things-in-themselves a "personal presupposition" of Kant's.23 This is to suggest that it was not because of any argument that Kant held the doc trine. This suggested explanation is not a very satisfying one, however. It amounts to saying that Kant had no to-him-compel ling reason except mental inertia for his strong belief that there are things-in-themselves, and this is difficult to credit. It would be surprising if such a prominent feature of his philosophy were Royce does not regard this as the whole story, however.
nothing but an unquestioningly inherited dogma. Surely it would be more plausible to suppose that he had some line of thought of his own that impelled him to this as a conclusion.
Another suggestion for removing the puzzle would be to say that Kant did have a to-him-compelling reason for affirming that there are things-in-themselves, but that this reason is supplied only by his ethical philosophy. In his ethical philosophy Kant holds that one's inexpugnable consciousness of the demands of morality requires one to believe that one possesses free will. And he holds freedom to be impossible in the sphere of appearances, where nothing can occur except according to deterministic laws. Thus the demands of morality, he thinks, require one to believe that one's self in its true nature is not just appearance but is something in itself. This line of thought does afford a practical (though not a theoretical) basis for affirming that there is a thing-in-itself (and also that there are other things-in-them selves, insofar as morality requires one to impute moral respon sibility to others). However, important though this is to Kant, it is a line of thought that does not satisfactorily answer the puz zle about why Kant was so confident that there are things-in themselves. Kant's affirmations that there are things-in-themselves occur from the beginning of the first Critique, whereas his practical postulate of freedom is enunciated only much later. Such being the case, it is implausible to suppose that he him self regarded his moral philosophy as providing the main basis for saying that there are things-in-themselves. Moreover, Kant never says that our knowledge that there are things-in-them selves is practical rather than theoretical knowledge, and one would have expected him to say this if he had believed it, for elsewhere he meticulously emphasizes the contrast between the theoretical and the practical. Kant's affirmations that there are things-in-themselves are unqualified and firm in tone; they con 1st. The world is either finite or infinite in size and age.
Thesis:
It cannot be infinite, so it is finite.
Antithesis: It cannot be finite, so it must be infinite.
2nd. The world either consists of atoms or its every part is divisible.
Thesis: The parts cannot all be divisible, so the world con sists of atoms.
Antithesis: Atoms are impossible, so each part is divisible.
Kant's view is that in each Antinomy the proof of the thesis and the proof of the antithesis would be rigorously sound, provided the initial disjunctive premise could be assumed true.
We may compare these antinomies with a more modern one, Russell's antinomy in set theory. Russell showed that a contra diction ensues if we suppose that the set of all sets not members of themselves must either be a member of itself or not a member of itself. For if it is, then it cannot be, and if it is not, then it must be. One way of escaping this antinomy is by rejecting the assumption that the set of all sets not members of themselves must either be a member of itself or not be a member of itself. How could this assumption fail to be true? The most straight forward way of rejecting the assumption is by denying that there is any such set as the one supposedly mentioned. That is, one can reject the idea that the singular term 'the set of all sets not members of themselves* names a set. If there is no such set, then it neither is true that it belongs to itself nor true that it does not. 
